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ABSTRACT
Global games of regime change –  that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which
a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it – have been used to
study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We
extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to accumulate information
over time and take actions in many periods. It is shown that dynamics may lead to multiple equilibria
under  the  same  information  assumptions  that  guarantee  uniqueness  in  the  static  benchmark.
Multiplicity originates in the interaction between the arrival of information over time and the
endogenous change in beliefs induced by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. This
interaction also generates interesting equilibrium properties, such as the possibility that fundamentals
predict the eventual regime outcome but not the timing or the number of attacks, or that dynamics
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Coordination games in which a status quo is abandoned once a suﬃciently large number of agents
takes an action that favors regime change have been used to study a variety of socioeconomic
phenomena. Whereas the earlier contributions in the literature focused on the existence and im-
plications of multiple equilibria when agents can perfectly coordinate with each other, recent work
on global games by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998, 2000, 2001)
has emphasized the fragility of this multiplicity to perturbations of the information structure away
from common knowledge: a unique equilibrium often survives when agents observe a payoﬀ-relevant
variable, such as the strength of the status quo, with small idiosyncratic noise.
Variants of this uniqueness result have been established in the context of currency crises, bank
runs, debt crises, and political change.1 Most of this work assumes a static coordination game, thus
abstracting from the possibility that agents may have the option to take multiple shots against the
regime. For many of the applications of interest, however, this possibility seems relevant.
In this paper, we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents
to take actions in multiple periods and accumulate information over time. There is a large number
of agents and two possible regimes, the status quo and an alternative. In any given period, each
agent has a binary choice: he may either “attack” the status quo (that is, take an action that favors
regime change) or “not attack”. Attacking is individually optimal if and only if the probability of
regime change in that period is suﬃciently high. The status quo, in turn, is abandoned if and only
if the fraction of agents attacking exceeds a critical value θ ∈ R, which parametrizes the strength of
the status quo. θ is the component of the payoﬀ structure — commonly referred to as the exogenous
fundamentals — which is never common knowledge among the agents. Instead, as time passes,
agents receive noisy private signals about θ.
We show that dynamics may sustain multiple equilibria under the same information assump-
tions that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark, namely that the precision of the agents’
private information is suﬃciently high relative to the precision of the initial common prior. Multi-
plicity originates in the interaction between two elements: the knowledge that the regime survived
past attacks and the arrival of new private information over time.
In the ﬁrst period, agents ﬁnd it dominant to attack for suﬃciently low realizations of their
private signals. This ensures that, in any equilibrium, regime change takes place in the ﬁrst period
for suﬃciently low θ. At any future date, the observation that the status quo is still in place makes
it common certainty that it is not too weak, for otherwise it would have collapsed under the ﬁrst
attack.
1See Morris and Shin (1998) for currency crises; Goldstein and Pauzner (2000) and Rochet and Vives (2004) for
bank runs; Morris and Shin (2004) and Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2004) for debt crises; Chamley (1999) for
regime switches; Atkeson (2000) and Edmond (2004) for riots and political change.
1This eﬀect implies that no agent is willing to attack in any subsequent period if he expects no
other agent to attack. Hence, there always exists an equilibrium in which no attack occurs after
the ﬁrst period. In fact, if no new information were to arrive over time, this would be the unique
equilibrium of the game. The possibility to take multiple shots against the regime would then add
nothing to the static analysis.
However, as agents receive new private signals about θ, the impact of the knowledge that the
regime survived past attacks on posterior beliefs eventually vanishes. For the same reason, the
dependence of posterior beliefs on the initial common prior also diminishes over time. When the
prior is relatively aggressive, in the sense that it induces a large attack in the ﬁrst period, the
increase in the precision of private information would induce less aggressive behavior even in the
absence of past attacks. In this case, no action after the ﬁrst period remains the unique equilibrium.
In contrast, when the prior is relatively lenient, both the discounting of the prior and the discounting
of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks contribute to making new attacks eventually
possible. Hence, there also exist equilibria where agents take multiple shots against the regime.
Indeed, we show that, unless the game ends for exogenous reasons in ﬁnite time, any arbitrary
number of attacks can be sustained in equilibrium.
In the benchmark model, we deliberately assume away the possibility that the critical size
of attack necessary for regime change varies over time. This allows us to isolate the eﬀects of
changes in information, as opposed to changes in fundamentals, on the dynamics of coordination.
Nevertheless, we also show that the multiplicity result is robust to the introduction of shocks to
the fundamentals — in which case dominant actions may exist in every period — provided that the
volatility of these shocks is suﬃciently small. In the limit, as the volatility vanishes, any equilibrium
of the benchmark model can be approximated arbitrarily closely by an equilibrium in the game
with shocks. What sustains the multiplicity of equilibria and the corresponding dynamics is again
the combination of the arrival of new information over time with the endogenous upward shift
in posterior beliefs that follows from the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. That
this shift takes the form of a truncation in the benchmark model simpliﬁes the construction of the
equilibrium set, but is not essential for the multiplicity result.
We also emphasize that multiplicity does not originate from the presence of exogenous public
signals or the observation of the size of past attacks. Indeed, for most of the analysis we assume
away any such source of information and concentrate on the case in which agents receive only
private signals over time. What the introduction of public news does, is to “smooth out” the
dependence of the determinacy of equilibria on the initial prior: multiple equilibria then exist
whatever the horizon of the game and for any prior mean and any relative precision of public and
private information. Finally, introducing endogenous signals about the size of past attacks — a
simple form of (noisy) social learning — does not change the equilibrium dynamics, except for the
2possibility that the endogenous information revealed by the size of an attack may substitute for
the arrival of new exogenous information and render further attacks possible immediately after an
unsuccessful one.
The existence of multiple equilibria leads to dynamics that might not have been possible with
either common knowledge or a unique equilibrium. For example, fundamentals may determine
the ﬁnal regime outcome (e.g., whether a currency is eventually devalued) but not the timing and
number of attacks. Moreover, dynamics may take the form of sequences of periods in which attacks
can not occur and agents only accumulate information, followed by periods in which an attack is
possible but does not take place, eventually resulting in a new attack. An economy can thus transit
from phases of tranquility to crises without any change in the underlying economic fundamentals.
Below, we discuss the relation of the paper to the pertinent literature. Section 2 then reviews the
static benchmark and introduces the dynamic model. Section 3 characterizes the set of monotone
equilibria. Section 4 establishes the multiplicity result and discusses equilibrium dynamics. Section
5 examines robustness to the introduction of shocks in the fundamentals. Section 6 introduces
public news and signals about past attacks. Section 7 concludes. Proofs omitted in the main text
are presented in the Appendix.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on dynamic
global games. Heidhues and Melissas (2003) identify a condition of dynamic strategic complemen-
tarity that suﬃces for uniqueness in an investment model; this condition is also implicit in Gian-
nitsarou and Toxvaerd’s (2003) uniqueness theorem for recursive binary-action games. Dasgupta
(2002) examines the role of social learning in a two-period investment model with irreversible ac-
tions. Levin (2001) considers a global game with overlapping generations of players. Goldstein and
Pauzner (2001) and Goldstein (2002) consider models of contagion. Frankel and Pauzner (2000),
on the other hand, consider a complete-information dynamic coordination game, where uniqueness
is obtained by assuming aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic inertia. None of these papers, however,
examines the role of information dynamics in games of regime change.
Closer to our analysis, Morris and Shin (1999) consider a dynamic model whose stage game
is similar to ours, but where fundamentals follow a random walk and are commonly observed at
the end of each period. This reduces the analysis to a sequence of static games with a unique
equilibrium.
This paper departs from the above literature in that it considers dynamics as a natural source of
information. In this respect, it shares with Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2003) — which considers
the signaling eﬀects of policy in a static game — the idea that endogenous information structures
may overturn uniqueness results in global games and lead to predictions that would have not been
possible with either common knowledge or a unique equilibrium.
Finally, we share with Chari and Kehoe (2003) the motivation that understanding the dynamics
3of information may help understand the dynamics of crises. However, whereas they focus on herding,
we examine the role of information for coordination.
2 A simple game of regime change
2.1 Static benchmark
Model set-up. There is a continuum of agents of measure one, indexed by i and uniformly
distributed over [0,1]. Agents move simultaneously, choosing between two actions: they can either
attack the status quo (i.e., take an action that favors regime change) or refrain from attacking.
The payoﬀ structure is illustrated in Table 1. The payoﬀ from not attacking (ai =0 )is zero,
whereas the payoﬀ from attacking (ai =1 )is 1 − c>0 if the status quo is abandoned (R =1 )
and −c<0 otherwise (R =0 ) ,w h e r ec ∈ (0,1) parametrizes the relative cost of attacking. An
agent hence ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if he expects regime change with probability at
least c. The status quo is in turn abandoned if and only if the measure of agents attacking, which
we denote by A, is greater than or equal to θ ∈ R, which parametrizes the strength of the status
quo. An agent’s incentive to attack thus increases with the aggregate size of attack, implying that
agents’ actions are strategic complements.2
Regime Change (A ≥ θ) Status Quo (A<θ )
Attack (ai =1 ) 1 − c −c
Not Attack (ai =0 ) 0 0
Table 1. Payoﬀs
Agents have heterogeneous information about the strength of the status quo. Nature ﬁrst draws
θ from a normal distribution N (z,1/β), which deﬁnes the initial common prior about θ.E a c h
agent then receives a private signal xi = θ + ξi, where ξi ∼ N (0,1/α) is noise, i.i.d. across agents
and independent of θ. The Normality assumptions allow to parametrize the information structure
parsimoniously with (α,β,z), that is, the precision of private information and the precision and
mean of the common prior.
Interpretation. Although the game presented above is highly stylized, it admits a variety
of interpretations and possible applications. The most celebrated examples are self-fulﬁlling bank
runs, currency attacks, and debt crises. In these contexts, regime change occurs, respectively, when
a large run forces the banking system to suspend its payments, when a large speculative attack
2T h er o l eo fc o o r d i n a t i o ni sm o s te v i d e n tw h e nθ is commonly known by all agents: for θ ∈ (0,1],t h e r ee x i s tt w o
pure-strategy equilibria, one in which all agents attack and the status quo is abandoned (A =1≥ θ) and another in
which no agent attacks and the status quo is maintained (A =0<θ ).
4forces the central bank to abandon the peg, or when a country/company fails to coordinate its
creditors and is forced to bankruptcy. The model can also be interpreted as one of political change,
in which a large number of citizens decide whether or not to take actions to subvert a repressive
dictator or some other political establishment.3
Equilibrium analysis. Note that the c.d.f. of an agent’s posterior about θ is decreasing in
his private signal x. Moreover, it is strictly dominant to attack for suﬃciently low signals – namely
for x<x , where x solves Pr(θ ≤ 0|x)=c – and not to attack for suﬃcient high signals – namely
for x>¯ x,where ¯ x solves Pr(θ ≤ 1|¯ x)=c. It is thus natural to look at monotone Bayesian Nash
equilibria in which the agents’ strategy is non-increasing in x.
Indeed, suppose there is a threshold ˆ x ∈ R such that each agent attacks if and only if x ≤ ˆ x.
The measure of agents attacking is then decreasing in θ and is given by A(θ)=P r ( x ≤ ˆ x|θ)=
Φ(
√
α(ˆ x − θ)), where Φ is the c.d.f. of the standard Normal. It follows that the status quo is
abandoned if and only if θ ≤ ˆ θ, where ˆ θ solves ˆ θ = A(ˆ θ), or equivalently
ˆ θ = Φ(
√
α(ˆ x − ˆ θ)). (1)
The posterior probability of regime change for an agent with signal x is then simply Pr(R =1 |x)=
Pr(θ ≤ ˆ θ|x). Since the latter is decreasing in x, each agent ﬁnds it optimal to attack if and only if





ˆ θ − α





A monotone equilibrium is thus identiﬁed by a joint solution (ˆ x, ˆ θ) to (1) and (2). Such a solution
always exists and is unique for all z i fa n do n l yi fα ≥ β2/(2π). Moreover, iterated elimination of
strictly dominated strategies implies that, when the monotone equilibrium is unique, there is no
other equilibrium. We conclude that
Proposition 1 (Static benchmark) In the static game, the equilibrium is unique if and only if
α ≥ β2/(2π), and is in monotone strategies.
2.2 Dynamic game
W em o d i f yt h es t a t i cg a m er e v i e w e da b o v ei nt w ow a y s :ﬁrst, we allow agents to attack the status
quo repeatedly; second, we let agents accumulate information over time.
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1,2,...}. The game continues as long as the status quo
is in place and is over once the status quo is abandoned. We denote with Rt =0the event that
the status quo is still in place at the beginning of period t,w i t hRt =1the alternative event, with
ait ∈ {0,1} the action of agent i,a n dw i t hAt ∈ [0,1] the measure of agents attacking in period
3For references, see footnote 1.
5t. Conditional on the regime being in place at the beginning of period t (Rt =0 ) , t h er e g i m ei s
abandoned in that period (Rt+1 =1 )if and only if At ≥ θ, where θ again represents the strength
of the status quo. Agent i’s payoﬀ in period t is
πit = ait (Rt+1 − c),
and his payoﬀ from the entire game is Πi =
P∞
t=1 ρt−1(1 − Rt)πit, where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the discount
factor.
Like in the static model, θ is drawn at the beginning of the game from N (z,1/β), which deﬁnes
the initial common prior, and never becomes common knowledge. Private information, however,
evolves over time. In each period t ≥ 1, every agent i receives a private signal ˜ xit = θ + ξit
about θ, where ξit ∼ N (0,1/ηt) is i.i.d. across i, independent of θ, and serially uncorrelated. Let
˜ xt
i = {˜ xiτ}t
τ=1 denote agent i’s history of private signals up to period t. Individual actions and the
size of past attacks are not observable,4 hence the public history in period t simply consists of the
information that the regime is still in place, whereas the private history of an agent is the sequence
of own private signals ˜ xt
i and own past actions. Finally, we let αt ≡
Pt
τ=1 ητ and assume that
∞ >α t ≥ β2/(2π) ∀t and lim
t→∞
αt = ∞.
As shown in the next section, αt parametrizes the precision of private information in period t. The
restrictions above ensure equilibrium uniqueness in the static game with precision αt, and that
private information becomes inﬁnitely precise only in the limit.
Remark. While this dynamic game is highly stylized, it captures two important dimensions
that are absent in the static benchmark: ﬁrst, the possibility of multiple attacks against the status
quo; and, second, the evolution of beliefs about the probability of regime change. By assuming that
per-period payoﬀs do not depend on past or future actions and by ignoring speciﬁc institutional
details, the model may of course fail to capture other interesting eﬀects introduced by dynamics,
such as, for example, the role of wealth accumulation or liquidity in currency crises. However,
abstracting from these other dimensions allows us to isolate information as the driving force for the
dynamics of coordination and crises.
Equilibrium. In what follows, we limit attention to monotone equilibria, that is, symmetric
Perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the probability an agent attacks in period t, which with a slight
a b u s eo fn o t a t i o nw ed e n o t ew i t hat(˜ xt), is non-increasing in his private signals ˜ xt and independent
of his own past actions.5 Restricting attention to this class of equilibria suﬃces to establish our
multiplicity results.
4The possibility that agents observe noisy signals about aggregate past activity is considered in Section 6.
5We do not restrict the set of available strategies: we look at equilibria in which these properties are satisﬁed.
63 Equilibrium characterization
Since neither individual nor aggregate actions are observable, and Rt =0is always compatible with
any strategy proﬁle at any t,6 no agent can detect out-of-equilibrium play as long as the status quo
is in place. It follows that beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule in any relevant history of the game.
Furthermore, payoﬀs in one period do not depend on own or other players’ actions in any other
period and hence strategies are sequentially rational if and only if they maximize period-by-period







˜ xt and αt = αt−1 + ηt,
with x1 =˜ x1 and α1 = η1; and note that xt is a suﬃcient statistic for the agent’s private information
˜ xt = {˜ xτ}t
τ=1 with respect to θ and therefore with respect to regime change as well. We conclude
that, in any monotone equilibrium,
at(˜ xt) ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
{(Pr[Rt+1 =1 |xt,R t =0 ]− c)a}, (3)
where Pr[·] is pinned down by Bayes’ rule using {at (·)}
∞
t=1 .
This also implies that, in any equilibrium of the dynamic game, agents play in period 1 exactly
as in the static game in which they can attack only in that period: an agent attacks if and only if
his private signal is suﬃciently low and the status quo is maintained if and only if θ is suﬃciently
high. The following lemma shows that a similar property applies to subsequent periods.7




t ∈ R ≡ R ∪
{±∞} and θ∗
t−1 ∈ (0,1), such that:
(i) at any t ≥ 1,an agent attacks if xt <x ∗
tand does not attack if xt >x ∗
t;
(ii) the status quo is in place at any t ≥ 2 if and only if θ>θ ∗
t−1.




1 > 0, this implies that there always exist equilibria in which nobody
attacks in period t ≥ 2,i nw h i c hc a s ex∗
t = −∞ and θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1. In particular, there exists an
equilibrium in which an attack takes place in period 1 and never after. If this were always the
unique equilibrium, the possibility to take repeated actions against the regime would add nothing
to the static analysis and the equilibrium outcome in the dynamic game would coincide with that
in the static benchmark. In what follows we thus examine under what conditions there also exist
equilibria with further attacks.
6Indeed, the regime always survives any attack for θ>1 and no realization of the private signal rules out θ>1.
7To simplify the notation, we allow for x
∗
t = −∞ and x
∗
t =+ ∞, with which we denote the case where an agent
attacks for, respectively, none or every realization of his private information.
7By Lemma 1, the size of the attack is given by At(θ)=P r ( x ≤ x∗
t|θ), which is decreasing
in θ, and the probability of regime change for an agent with suﬃcient statistic xt is Pr(Rt+1 =






, which is decreasing in xt if θ∗
t >θ ∗
t−1. It follows that, in































´´ = c. (5)
Conditions (4) and (5) are the analogs in the dynamic game of conditions (1) and (2) in the static
game: (4) states that the equilibrium size of an attack is equal to the critical size that triggers
regime change if and only if the fundamentals are θ∗
t, while (5) states that an agent is indiﬀerent
between attacking and not attacking if and only if his private information is x∗
t.
Solving (4) for x∗
t gives x∗
t = X (θ∗










where X :[ 0 ,1] × R+ → R and U :[ 0 ,1] × R × R2
+ × R → [−c,1 − c] are deﬁned as follows:8
X (θ∗,α) ≡ θ∗ + 1 √
αΦ−1 (θ∗)
U (θ∗,θ −1,α,β,z) ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩























¶ − c if θ∗ > max{0,θ −1}
−c if θ∗ ≤ θ−1
The functions X and U have a simple interpretation: X (θ∗;α) is the “marginal agent” that im-
plements regime change for θ ≤ θ∗ when the precision of private information is α (that is, the
threshold x∗ such that, if agents attack if and only if x ≤ x∗, the status quo is abandoned if
a n do n l yi fθ ≤ θ∗); U (θ∗,θ −1,α,β,z) is the expected net payoﬀ of the marginal agent from at-
tacking, conditional on the knowledge that θ>θ −1. Condition (6) thus simply requires that the
marginal agent is indiﬀerent between attacking and not attacking in period t ≥ 2.A s f o r t =1 ,
since the regime has never been challenged in the past, the corresponding indiﬀerence condition is
U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β,z)=0 , where U (θ,−∞,α,β,z) coincides with the payoﬀ of the marginal agent
in the static benchmark.
The next proposition then provides the complete set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
monotone equilibria.
8With a slight abuse of notation, we let Φ(+∞)=1 , Φ(−∞)=0 , Φ
−1(1) = ∞ and Φ
−1(0) = −∞.
8Proposition 2 (Equilibrium characterization) {at (·)}∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium if and




(i) for all t, at (·)=1if xt <x ∗
t and at (·)=0if xt >x ∗
t.
(ii) for t =1 ,θ ∗




(iii) for any t ≥ 2, either θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1 > 0 and x∗
t = −∞, or θ∗
t >θ ∗










An equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 2 provides a simple algorithm for constructing the entire set of monotone equilibria:
start with t =1and let θ∗
1 be the unique solution to U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β,z)=0 ; proceed to period
t =2and let either θ∗
2 = θ∗
1 or θ∗








the set of monotone equilibria. Note that the above characterization is independent of whether the
horizon is ﬁnite or inﬁnite: it is clearly valid even if the game ends exogenously at an arbitrary
period T<∞.
Existence of equilibrium follows immediately from the fact that U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β,z)=0always
admits a solution and hence θ∗
t = θ∗
1 for all t is always an equilibrium. To understand whether there
are other equilibria, the next lemma investigates the properties of U and the existence of solutions
to (6).
Lemma 2 (i) U (θ∗,θ −1,α,β,z) is continuous in all its arguments, non-monotonic and single-
peaked in θ∗ when θ−1 ∈ (0,1), and strictly decreasing in θ−1 and z for θ−1 <θ ∗. Furthermore, for
all θ−1 < 1 and θ∗ >θ −1, limα→∞ U (θ∗,θ −1,·)=θ∞ − θ∗, where θ∞ ≡ 1 − c.
(ii) Let ˆ θt b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt oU(ˆ θt,−∞,α t,β,z)=0 . As o l u t i o nt o(6) exists only if
θ∗
t−1 < ˆ θt and is necessarily bounded from above by ˆ θt.
(iii) If θ∗
t−1 >θ ∞, as o l u t i o nt o(6) does not exist for αt suﬃciently high.
(iv) If θ∗
t−1 <θ ∞, as o l u t i o nt o(6) necessarily exists for αt suﬃciently high.
(v) If θ∗
t−1 is the highest solution to (6) for period t − 1,t h e r ee x i s t sα >α t−1 such that (6)
admits no solution for any period τ ≥ t such that ατ <α .





with respect to θ∗ in any period t ≥ 2 (where
0 <θ ∗
t−1 < 1) is a direct consequence of the fact that, for θ∗ <θ ∗
t−1, the marginal agent attaches
probability zero to regime change. For θ∗ >θ ∗
t−1, on the other hand, his belief about regime change
is necessarily positive, but converges to zero as θ∗ → 1,f o rt h e nX (θ∗,α t) →∞and hence he
attaches probability one to θ>1. His payoﬀ is thus initially increasing and then decreasing, as
illustrated by the solid line in Figure 1. Any intersection with the horizontal axis corresponds to







θt  ^  θt-1 * 
θ  * 
Figure 1: The payoﬀ of the marginal agent.
game. Whereas the monotonicity of the latter ensures uniqueness, the non-monotonicity in the
dynamic game leaves open the possibility for multiple equilibria.
The other properties identiﬁed in Lemma 2 are also quite intuitive. An increase in the mean of
the common prior implies a ﬁrst-order stochastic-dominance change in the posterior beliefs about
θ, which explains why U decreases with z. To understand why U is also decreasing in θ−1, note
that the more aggressive the attacks in the past, the stronger the regime must have been in order
to have survived these attacks, and therefore the lower the expected payoﬀ from attacking in the
current period.
For the same reason, at any t ≥ 2, the payoﬀ of the marginal agent is always lower than
U (θ∗,−∞,α t,β,z), that is, the payoﬀ in the static game where the precision of private information
is αt. This explains why the static-game threshold ˆ θt (which corresponds to the intersection of
the dashed line with the horizontal axis in Figure 1) is an upper bound for any solution to (6).
Nevertheless, the impact of the information that θ>θ ∗
t−1 on posterior beliefs vanishes for any
xt >θ ∗
t−1 as αt →∞ , and hence, for any θ∗ >θ ∗





and U(θ∗,−∞,α t,β,z) also vanishes. Combined with the fact that U(θ∗,−∞,α t,β,z) → θ∞ − θ∗
as αt →∞ , this in turn implies that, for αt suﬃciently high, (6) admits a solution if and only if
θ∗
t−1 <θ ∞, where θ∞ is the limit of the equilibrium threshold of the static game as the precision of
private information becomes inﬁnite (i.e., θ∞ =l i m t→∞ ˆ θt).
Finally, to understand (v), note that any unsuccessful attack causes an upward shift (a ﬁrst-
order stochastic-dominance change) in the posterior beliefs about the strength of the regime, which
other things equal reduces the expected payoﬀ from attacking. It follows that, if the largest possible
attack (that is, the highest solution of (6)) is played in one period and no new information arrives
thereafter, no attack is possible in any subsequent period. By continuity then, further attacks
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Figure 2: Equilibria with multiple attacks.
4 Multiplicity and dynamics
Part (v) of Lemma 2 highlights that the arrival of new private information is necessary for further
attacks to become possible after period 1. Whether this is also suﬃcient depends on the initial
prior. This is because an increase in the precision of private information leads agents to discount,
not only the information conveyed by the fact that the regime survived past attacks, but also their
initial prior beliefs.
When z is low (“aggressive prior”), an increase in the precision of private information makes
the marginal agent less aggressive in the static game (that is, ˆ θt decreases with αt). The knowledge
that the regime survived past attacks then only reinforces this eﬀect. Therefore, for z suﬃciently
low, there exists a unique equilibrium and is such that no attack ever occurs after the ﬁrst period.
When instead z is high (“lenient prior”), the arrival of new private information makes the
marginal agent more aggressive, and may eventually oﬀset the incentive not to attack induced by
the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks. Indeed, if z is high enough so that θ∗
1 <θ ∞,
Lemma 2 ensures that a second attack necessarily becomes possible once αt is suﬃciently high.
Such an example is illustrated in Figure 2. The dashed line represents the payoﬀ of the marginal
agent in period 1. Its intersection with the horizontal axis deﬁnes θ∗
1 <θ ∞. The payoﬀ of the
marginal agent in period 2 is represented by the dotted line, and that in period 3 by the solid line.
Clearly, α2 is low enough that no attack is possible in period 2.I nc o n t r a s t ,α3 is high enough that
a new attack is possible. There thus exist at least three equilibria in this example: one in which
θ∗
t = θ∗









3 for all t ≥ 3, where θ0
3 and θ00
3 correspond to the two intersections of the solid line with
the horizontal axis.
11In the example of Figure 2, both θ0
3 and θ00
3 are lower than θ∞. By Lemma 2, then, a third attack
also becomes possible at some future date. More generally, if z is suﬃciently high, any solution
to (6) is bounded from above by θ∞ in all periods, which ensures that a new attack eventually
becomes possible after any unsuccessful one. Hence, for z suﬃciently high, not only there are
multiple equilibria, but any arbitrary number of attacks can be sustained in equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Multiplicity) There exist thresholds z ≤ z ≤ z such that:
(i) If z ≤ z,t h e r ei saunique monotone equilibrium and an attack occurs only in period one.
(ii) If z ∈ (z,z), there are at most ﬁnitely many monotone equilibria and there exists ¯ t<∞
such that no attack occurs after period ¯ t.
(iii) If z>z, there are inﬁnitely many equilibria; if in addition z>z, for any t and N, there
is an equilibrium in which N attacks occur after period t.
Finally, z = z = z when c ≤ 1/2, whereas z ≤ z<z when c>1/2.
Proof. Recall that θ∗
1 = ˆ θ1 and, for all t ≥ 2,θ ∗
t < ˆ θt, where ˆ θt = ˆ θ(αt,β,z) is the unique
solution to U(ˆ θ,−∞,α t,β,z)=0 . As we show in Lemma A1 in the Appendix, there exist thresholds
z ≤ z ≤ z (possibly functions of α1 and β) with the following properties: ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 for all t if z ≤ z;
ˆ θ1 ≤ (≥)θ∞ if and only z ≥ (≤)z; and ˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t if and only if z>z.
(i) Consider ﬁrst z ≤ z. Then, ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 = θ∗
1 for all t, and hence, by part (ii) of Lemma 2, (6)
admits no solution at any t ≥ 2. The unique monotone equilibrium is thus θ∗
t = θ∗
1 for all t.
(ii) Next, consider z ∈ (z,z), in which case ˆ θ1 = θ∗
1 >θ ∞, but we can not rule out the
possibility that there exists a period t ≥ 2 such that ˆ θt > ˆ θ1 and U (θ∗,θ∗
1,α t,β,z)=0admits a
solution. Nevertheless, since θ∗
t−1 ≥ θ∗
1 >θ ∞ for all t, by part (iii) of Lemma 2 and the fact that
αt →∞as t →∞ ,t h e r ee x i s t s¯ t<∞ such that (6) admits no solution for t ≥ ¯ t.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
U is single-peaked, (6) has at most two solutions for t<¯ t. Hence, there are at most ﬁnitely many
monotone equilibria, and in any equilibrium no attack occurs after period ¯ t.
(iii) Finally, consider z>z, in which case θ∗
1 <θ ∞. Then, by part (iv) of Lemma 2, there exists
a t0 < ∞ such that U (θ∗,θ∗
1,α t,β,z)=0admits a solution for all t ≥ t0. Hence, for any t ≥ t0,
there is an equilibrium in which θ∗
τ = θ∗
1 for τ<t ,θ ∗
t solves U (θ∗
t,θ∗
1,α t,β,z)=0 , and θ∗
τ = θ∗
t for
all τ>t .That is, there exist (countably) inﬁnitely many equilibria, indexed by the time at which
the second attack occurs.
When z ∈ (z,z), the second attack may lead to a threshold θ∗
t >θ ∞, in which case a third
attack might be impossible. If however z>z,t h e nˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t, and hence by part (ii) of
Lemma 2, θ∗
t <θ ∞, for all t. But then by part (iv), a new attack eventually becomes possible after
any unsuccessful one. It follows that, for any t ≥ 1 and any N ≥ 1, there exist increasing sequences
{t2,...,t N} and {θ2,...,θN}, with t2 ≥ t, such that U (θ2,θ∗
1,α t2,β,z)=0 ,U(θ3,θ 2,α t3,β,z)=0 ,
and so on. The following is then an equilibrium: θ∗
τ = θ∗
1 for τ<t 2,θ ∗
τ = θj for τ ∈ {tj,...,t j+1−1}
12and j ∈ {2,...,N− 1}, and θ∗
τ = θN for τ ≥ tN. That is, for any t ≥ 1 and any N ≥ 1, there exists
an equilibrium in which N attacks occur after date t.
The existence of inﬁnitely many equilibria in the case z>z relies on the assumption that the
game continues forever as long as the status quo is in place: if the game ended for exogenous reasons
at a ﬁnite date, there would exist only ﬁnitely many equilibria. Nevertheless, as long as z>z and
αt →∞as t →∞ , then, for any M, there exists a ﬁnite T such that the game would have at least
M equilibria if it ended at date T. Moreover, even if T =2 ,α 2 high enough suﬃces for the game to
have multiple equilibria when z>z. Finally, as we show in Section 6.1, the introduction of public
signals ensures the existence of multiple equilibria for any T ≥ 2 and any z.
In the remainder of this section, we identify equilibrium properties that may turn useful in
understanding crises phenomena.
Corollary 1 Suppose θ>θ ∞ and z>z. The status quo survives in any equilibrium. Neverthe-
less, there exists t < ∞ such that, at any t ≥ t, an attack is possible, yet need not take place.
Furthermore, any arbitrary number of attacks can occur.
This seems to square well with the common view that economic fundamentals may help predict
eventual outcomes (e.g., whether a currency is eventually devalued) but not when a crisis will occur
or whether attacks will cease. On the contrary, this view is inconsistent with the common-knowledge
version of the model, in which case fundamentals fail to predict both the timing of attacks and the
eventual regime outcome,9 as well as with unique-equilibrium models like Morris and Shin (1999),
in which both the timing of attacks and the ultimate fate of the regime are uniquely pinned down
by fundamentals.
Consider now how the dynamics of attacks depend on the dynamics of information.
Corollary 2 After the most aggressive attack for a given period occurs, the game enters a phase
of tranquillity, during which no attack is possible. This phase is longer the slower the arrival of
private information.
Along with the property that for θ>θ ∞ and z>z a new attack eventually becomes possible
after any unsuccessful one, the above result implies that dynamics may take the form of cycles in
which the economy alternates from phases of tranquillity to periods of crisis, eventually resulting
into a new attack, without any change in the underlying fundamentals. Once again, this would not
be possible either under common knowledge or with a unique equilibrium.
9Of course, this is true provided θ ∈ [0,1]. If instead θ/ ∈ [0,1], fundamentals predict both the timing and the ﬁnal
outcome, as for θ<0 it is dominant to attack immediately and for θ>1 it is dominant never to attack.
135 Unobservable shocks
In this section, we examine the possibility that the critical size of attack that triggers regime change
varies stochastically over time due to unobservable shocks. This is not only a realistic scenario,
but also an appropriate perturbation. In the model without shocks, the knowledge that the regime
is in place at t ≥ 2 makes it common certainty that θ>0, which explains why there always exist
equilibria in which nobody attacks at t ≥ 2. In contrast, shocks may guarantee that a positive
measure of agents attack in every period by “smoothing out” the information generated by the
knowledge that the regime survived past attacks and ensuring the existence of a lower dominance
region in every period.
We modify the game as follows. Agents continue to receive private signals about θ as in the
benchmark model, but the regime is now abandoned in period t i fa n do n l yi fAt ≥ θ + δωt,w h e r e
δ ≥ 0 and ωt is a real random variable with continuous c.d.f. F, independent of θ and the noise in
the agents’ signals. ωt can be interpreted as a shock to the fundamentals (i.e., the strength of the
regime) and δ as the volatility of these shocks. Denoting with Γ(δ) the game in which the volatility
is δ, the baseline model can be nested as δ =0 .
Equilibrium characterization with δ>0. In the presence of shocks, the regime outcome
depends, not only on θ, but also on ωt. As a result, we loose the ability to characterize the set of
monotone equilibria in terms of a sequence of truncation points for θ. Nevertheless, we can still
characterize strategies as sequences of thresholds {¯ xt}∞
t=1 such that an agent attacks in period t if
a n do n l yi fxt ≤ ¯ xt,w h e r e¯ xt ∈ R.
Consider ﬁrst the regime outcomes induced by a given {¯ xt}∞
t=1. The size of the attack in
period t is At (θ)=Φ
¡√
αt (¯ xt − θ)
¢
and hence the status quo is abandoned if and only if ωt ≤








/δ. It follows that the probability of regime change in period t
conditional on θ and given that agents use monotone strategies with threshold ¯ xt, is
pt (θ;¯ xt,δ)=F (¯ ωt (θ;¯ xt,δ)).




denote the density of the common posterior about θ,












−∞ [1 − pt−1 (θ0;¯ xt−1,δ)]ψt−1 (θ0;¯ xt−2,δ)dθ0 =
Πt−1
s=1 [1 − ps (θ;¯ xs,δ)]ψ1 (θ)
R +∞
−∞ Πt−1





β (θ − z)) is the density of the initial prior. We similarly denote the density




for t ≥ 2 and ψ1 (θ|x) for t =1 .







expected payoﬀ from attacking in period t for an agent with suﬃcient statistic x when all other

















depends on both the contemporaneous threshold ¯ xt and the sequence of past
thresholds ¯ xt−1; the former determines the probability of regime change conditional on θ,w h e r e a s
























if ¯ xt = −∞
Vt is the analogue of the function U in the benchmark model: it represents the net payoﬀ from
attacking in period t for the marginal agent with threshold ¯ xt.10




is continuous in ¯ xt for
any ¯ xt ∈ R
t−1 × R, which we use to establish the existence, and complete the characterization, of
monotone equilibria.
Proposition 3 For any δ>0, {at (·)}∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium for Γ(δ) if and only if there
exists a sequence {¯ xt}
∞
t=1 such that:
(i) for all t, at (·)=1if xt < ¯ xt and at (·)=0if xt > ¯ xt;
(ii) for t =1 , ¯ x1 ∈ R and V1 (¯ x1;δ)=0 ;









An equilibrium exists for any δ>0.
Convergence to benchmark game. We next consider the properties of the equilibrium
set as δ → 0.L e t θt (¯ xt) be the unique solution to θ = Φ
¡√
αt (¯ xt − θ)
¢
, with θt (−∞)=0and
θt(+∞)=1 , and θt
¡
¯ xt¢
=m a x τ≤t{θτ (¯ xt)}.A sδ → 0, the dependence of the regime outcome on
the shock ωt vanishes: for any ¯ xt and any θ 6= θt (¯ xt),
pt (θ;¯ xt,δ) → pt (θ;¯ xt,0) ≡
(
1 if θ ≤ θt (¯ xt)
0 if θ>θ t (¯ xt)
(7)
It follows that the common posterior in any period t ≥ 2 converges pointwise to the truncated
Normal generated by the knowledge that θ>θ t−1
¡
¯ xt−1¢
























10Since the distribution of x given θ satisﬁes the MLRP and pt (θ;¯ xt,δ) is decreasing in θ, by standard representation



















is well-deﬁned at ¯ xt = ±∞.









The pointwise convergence of pt and ψt in turn implies pointwise convergence of the payoﬀ
of the marginal agent except when t ≥ 2 and ¯ xt = −∞. In particular, for t =1and any ¯ x1,

























= −c when t ≥ 2 and ¯ xt = −∞, note
that, in the presence of shocks, an agent with suﬃciently low xt may attach probability higher
than c to regime change in period t ≥ 2 even if he expects no other agent to attack in that period.
When this is the case, a positive measure of agents may attack in every period in the perturbed
game, unlike the benchmark model. Nevertheless, the pointwise convergence of Vt for any ¯ xt > −∞
ensures that this dominance region vanishes as δ → 0.
More generally, we can prove that “essentially” all equilibria {x∗
t}∞
t=1 in the benchmark game
Γ(0) can be approximated by equilibria {¯ xt (δ)}∞
t=1 in the perturbed game Γ(δ) for δ>0 small





reaches its maximum at x∗









Theorem 2 (Shocks in fundamentals) For any ε>0,a n da n yT ≥ 1,t h e r ee x i s t sδ (ε,T) > 0
such that, for all δ<δ(ε,T), the following is true:
For any equilibrium {x∗
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(0) such that x∗




for all t ∈ {2,...,T},
there exists an equilibrium {¯ xt (δ)}∞
t=1 of Γ(δ) such that, for all t ≤ T, either |x∗
t − ¯ xt(δ)| <ε ,o r
x∗
t = −∞and ¯ xt (δ) < −1/ε.
The above establishes convergence of equilibrium play in the ﬁrst T periods of the inﬁnite-
horizon game, for any ﬁnite T.S i n c e δ (ε,T) may converge to 0 as T →∞ , the result need not
hold for an inﬁnite number of periods. Of course, if the game ended for exogenous reasons at T,
the above would immediately imply convergence in all periods of the ﬁnite-horizon game.
The result is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 for T =2 . The solid line in Figure 3 repre-
sents the p.d.f. of the common posterior in period 2 generated by equilibrium play in period 1
in the game without shocks (δ =0 ) . This is simply the initial prior truncated at θ∗
1 = θ1 (x∗
1),
where x∗
1 is the unique solution to V1 (x∗
1;0) = 0 (or equivalently where θ∗
1 is the unique solu-
tion to U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β,z)=0 ). The other two lines represent the equilibrium common poste-
riors ψ2 (θ;¯ x1 (δ),δ) for the game with shocks (δ>0), where ¯ x1 (δ) is the unique solution to
V1 (¯ x1 (δ);δ)=0 ; the dotted line corresponds to a relatively high δ and the dashed one to a low




t=1 is a monotone equilibrium of Γ(0) if and











Figure 4: Payoﬀ of the marginal agent with and without shocks.
δ. Since the support of ωt is the entire real line, the probability of regime change is less than 1 for
any θ and therefore ψ2 assigns positive probability to all θ. However, as δ becomes smaller, ¯ x1 (δ)
converges to x∗
1 and the probability of regime change converges to 1 for θ<θ ∗
1 and to 0 for θ>θ ∗
1.
By implication, the smooth common posterior of the perturbed game in period 2 converges to the
truncated one of the benchmark model.
In Figure 4, the solid line represents the payoﬀ V2 (x∗
1,x 2;0) of the marginal agent in period
2 for δ =0 , whereas the other two lines represent V2 (¯ x1 (δ),x 2;δ) for δ>0.12 Note that, for
x2 small enough, V2 is negative when δ =0but positive when δ>0, which implies that nobody
attacking in period 2 is part of an equilibrium in the benchmark model but not in the game with
12In order to illustrate V2 over its entire domain, the ﬁgure depicts V2 (¯ x1 (δ),x 2;δ) against Φ(x2) rather than x2.
17shocks.13 Moreover, when δ is high (dotted line), V2 is monotonic in x2 and therefore has a single
intersection with the horizontal line, in which case the equilibrium would be unique if the game
e n d e di np e r i o d2. When, instead, δ is suﬃciently small (dashed line), V2 is non-monotonic and
has three intersections, which correspond to three diﬀerent equilibria for the two-period game with
shocks. Finally, the middle and the highest intersections approximate the two intersections of the
solid line, while the lowest intersection is arbitrarily small, thus approximating x∗
2 = −∞.A l o n g
with the fact that ¯ x1 (δ) converges to x∗
1, this implies that any equilibrium of the two-period game
without shocks can be approximated by an equilibrium in the perturbed game.
In conclusion, what sustains multiplicity in the dynamic game is the non-monotonicity of the
payoﬀ of the marginal agent generated by the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks.
That this knowledge resulted in posterior beliefs that assign zero measure to suﬃciently low θ in
the benchmark model, is not essential.
6 Public news and signals about past attacks
In this section, we consider two extensions of the information structure assumed in the benchmark
model.
6.1 Exogenous public signals
To capture the eﬀect of public news, we now modify the game as follows. In addition to their private
signals, agents observe in each period t ≥ 1 a public signal ˜ zt = θ + εt,w h e r eεt is common noise,
normally distributed with zero mean and precision ηz
t > 0, serially uncorrelated, and independent
of θ and the agent’s private noise. These signals may represent, for example, the information
generated by news analysis in the media, publication of government statistics, or announcements
by policy makers. We also allow for the possibility that the game ends for exogenous reasons at a
ﬁnite date and denote the horizon of the game with T, where T ∈ {2,3,...} or T = ∞.
The common posterior about θ conditional on ˜ zt ≡ {˜ zτ}t









˜ zt,β t = βt−1 + ηz
t,
with (z0,β 0)=( z,β). However, since equilibrium play in past periods now depends on the realiza-
tions of past public signals, zt is not a suﬃcient statistic conditional on Rt =0 .W e t h u s a l l o w
agents to condition their actions on the entire sequence ˜ zt, or equivalently on zt ≡ {zτ}t
τ=1.A p a r t
13In the examples in Figures 3 and 4, an agent ﬁnds it optimal to attack in period 2 for suﬃciently low x2,e v e n
if he expects no other agent to attack. However, this need not be the case if ωt had a bounded support and δ were
small enough.
18from this modiﬁcation, the set of monotone equilibria can be constructed in a similar way as in the
benchmark model.
Proposition 4 {at (·)}T





t=1 , with x∗
t : Rt → Rand θ∗
t : Rt → (0,1), such that:









(ii) at t =1 ,θ ∗
1 (z1) solves U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β 1,z 1)=0and x∗
1 (z1)=X(θ∗
1 (z1),α 1)

































Like in the benchmark model without public news, there always exist equilibria in which attacks





, (9) admits a solution if and only





is always ﬁnite. Hence, there also exist equilibria in which
an attack occurs in period t for suﬃciently low realizations of zt. The following then extends and
reinforces the multiplicity result of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Public news) In the game with public news, there always exist multiple equilibria,
no matter the mean z of the prior, the precisions {αt,β t}
T
t=1 of private and public information, and
the horizon T of the game.
Consider now how the introduction of public news aﬀects the ability of an “econometrician”
to predict the regime outcome and/or the occurrence of an attack in any given period. For any
t, any θ ∈ (0,1), and any θ∗
t−1 <θ ,(9) admits a solution higher than θ if and only if zt is low
enough, implying that, conditional on θ, the probability that the status quo is abandoned in any
g i v e np e r i o di ss t r i c t l yb e t w e e n0 and 1. It follows that an econometrician who can observe θ but
can not observe zt, necessarily faces uncertainty about the event of regime change. On the other
hand, if he also knows zt, he may be able to perfectly predict the regime outcome in a given period
for some combinations of θ and zt, without, however, being able to predict whether an attack will
take place. For example, at any t ≥ 2,i fθ>¯ θt
¡
zt¢
>θ 1 (z1),w h e r eθ1 (z1) is the lowest solution
to U (θ∗,−∞,α 1,β 1,z 1)=0and ¯ θt
¡
zt¢
the highest solution to U (θ∗,θ1 (z1),α t,β t,z t),14 there is
no equilibrium in which the status is abandoned in period t, but there are both an equilibrium in
which an attack occurs and one in which no attack takes place in that period. The combination of
fundamentals and public information may help predict regime outcomes but not the occurrence of


















19Finally, note that the threshold ¯ zt, below which (9) admits a solution, decreases with θ∗
t−1.
Hence, an unsuccessful attack, other things equal, causes a discrete increase in the probability the
game enters a phase of inaction during which no attack is possible. In this sense, the prediction of
the benchmark model that equilibrium dynamics are characterized by the alternation of phases of
tranquility and phases of crises, survives the introduction of public news, but the transition from
one phase to another is now stochastic, as it depends on the realization of zt.
6.2 Signals about past attacks
We now introduce an additional source of information by allowing agents to receive private and
public signals about the size of past attacks. These signals are, respectively,
˜ Xit = S (At−1,u it) and ˜ Zt = S (At−1,υ t),
for t ≥ 2, where uit is idiosyncratic noise, υt is common noise, and S :[ 0 ,1] × R → R.T o
preserve Normality of the information structure, we adopt a similar speciﬁcation as Dasgupta
(2002): S (A,u)=Φ−1 (A)+u, uit ∼ N (0,1/γx
t ), and υt ∼ N (0,1/γz
t ).







) —w h e r ex∗
t−1
may depend on exogenous/endogenous public signals — and following similar steps as in Section 3,
we can again construct suﬃcient statistics xt and zt with precisions αt and βt such that








































αt = αt−1 + ηx
t + 1t−1αt−1γx
t and βt = βt−1 + ηz
t + 1t−1αt−1γz
t ,
where 1t is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if an attack occurrs at t (At > 0) and 0 otherwise.
Although the realizations of (xt,z t) and similarly the dynamics of (αt,β t) are now partly
endogenous, the equilibrium characterization is otherwise the same as in the model with only
exogenous signals. By implication, the multiplicity results extend to the game with signals about
past attacks. Similarly, the structure of equilibrium dynamics remains as in the benchmark model,
except for the property that an unsuccessful attack does not necessarily reduce the incentives for
further attacks. This is because an unsuccessful attack now also generates new private and public
signals, which in some cases may oﬀset the impact of the knowledge that the status quo is still in
place.




t =0 ), in
which case the only novel eﬀect is that an unsuccessful attack leads to an endogenous increase in
20αt. A further attack is then possible only if this increase is large enough, like in the benchmark
game. On the other hand, when the endogenous signal is public (γz
t > 0=γx
t ),an e wa t t a c k
becomes possible if this signal is low enough, like in the case with exogenous public news.
We conclude that signals about the size of past attacks may substitute for the exogenous arrival
of private and/or public information, but do not otherwise aﬀect the analysis.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examined how the dynamics of information inﬂuences the dynamics of coordination in
a global game of regime change. We found that dynamics may sustain multiple equilibria under
the same informational assumptions that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark examined
in the literature.
Although the model is highly stylized and abstracts from all sorts of institutional details and
intertemporal payoﬀ linkages, it generates a few distinctive predictions for equilibrium dynamics,
such as the possibility that fundamentals predict regime outcomes but not the timing and number
of attacks, or the succession of phases of tranquility, during which agents accumulate information
and no attacks are possible, and periods of crises, during which attacks may occur but do no
necessarily take place. These predictions may help understand the dynamics of crises phenomena
such as currency attacks, ﬁnancial crashes, or political change. Extending the analysis to these
applications is a promising line for future research.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Solving (1) for ˆ x gives ˆ x = ˆ θ + α−1/2Φ−1(ˆ θ). Substituting this into














α (z − θ)
i´
− c. (11)
Note that Ust (θ;·) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in θ ∈ (0,1), with limθ→0 Ust (θ)=1− c>0





























2π, the condition α ≥ β2/(2π) is both necessary and suﬃcient
for Ust to be monotonic in θ, in which case the monotone equilibrium is unique. Finally, for
21the proof that only this equilibrium survives iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, see
Morris and Shin (2000, 2001).
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .We prove the claim by induction. At t =1 , the result necessarily holds
since in any equilibrium, the agents’ strategy for t =1is the same as in the static benchmark.
Consider next any t ≥ 2 and suppose that the result holds for any τ ≤ t − 1. Since at (·) is
non-increasing in ˜ xt, At (θ) is non-increasing in θ, implying that either At (θ) <θ(and therefore
Rt+1 =0 ) for all θ>θ ∗
t−1, in which case θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1, or there exists θ∗
t >θ ∗
t−1 such that At(θ) <θif
and only if θ>θ ∗
t. In the former case, Pr(Rt+1 =1 |xt,R t =0 )=0for all xt and hence x∗
t = −∞.
In the latter,























which is strictly decreasing in xt and converges to 1 as xt →− ∞and to 0 as xt → +∞, implying
that there exists x∗
t ∈ R such that Pr(θ ≤ θ∗
t|xt,θ > θ∗
t−1) ≥ (≤)c if and only if xt ≤ (≥)x∗
t. In
either case, At (θ) < 1 for all θ and hence θ∗
t < 1, which together with θ∗
t ≥ θ∗
1 > 0, implies that
θ∗
t ∈ (0,1) for all t, which completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .Necessity follows from the arguments in the main text. For suﬃ-
ciency, take any sequence {x∗
t,θ∗
t}∞
t=1that satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii); let θ∗
0 = −∞; suppose
all other agents follow strategies as in (i), in which case Rt =0i fa n do n l yi fθ>θ ∗
t−1, for all t ≥ 1;
and consider the best response for an individual agent. If θ∗
t = θ∗
t−1, in which case t ≥ 2,θ ∗
t−1 > 0
and x∗






=0for all xt and therefore
not attacking is indeed optimal. If instead θ∗
t >θ ∗








t = X (θ∗













if and only if xt ≤ (≥)X (θ∗
t,α t) and
therefore it is indeed optimal to attack for xt <x ∗
t and not to attack for xt >x ∗
t.
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (i) follows directly by inspecting U.





<U(θ∗,−∞,α t,β,z) for all θ∗ (since θ∗
t−1 > −∞) and






< 0 for all θ∗ ≥ b θt, which gives the result.
For (iii),t a k ea n yθ∗
t−1 >θ ∞. Note that for all θ∗ ∈ [θ∗
t−1,1], limα→∞ U (θ∗,−∞,α,β,z)=
θ∞ − θ∗ < 0. Since U (θ∗,−∞,α,β,z) is continuous in θ∗ and [θ∗
t−1,1] is compact, it follows that




















< 0 for all θ∗ and therefore (6) admits
no solution.
22For (iv), take any θ∗





= θ∞ − θ∗ > 0 for any θ∗ ∈
(θ∗






















follows then that (6) admits a solution for αt > α.
Finally, consider (v).F i x t ≥ 2,θ ∗
t−2,α t−1,β ,and z (where we use the convention θ∗
0 =
−∞) and suppose that θ∗






< 0 for all θ∗ >θ ∗
t−1. This, together with the properties that U (θ∗,θ −1,α,β,z)
is non-increasing in θ−1, continuous in θ∗, and equal to −c for θ∗ ≤ θ−1, implies that there ex-





< −∆ for all θ∗ ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, by continu-
ity of U in (θ∗,α), there exists α>α t−1 such that U (θ∗,·,α,·) is uniformly continuous over






for all α ∈ [αt−1,α) and all θ∗ ∈ [0,1], which proves that (6) admits no solution in any period τ>t
for which ατ <α .
Lemma A1 There exist thresholds z ≤ z ≤ z such that: ˆ θt ≤ ˆ θ1 for all t if z ≤ z; ˆ θ1 ≤ (≥)θ∞ if
and only z ≥ (≤)z; and ˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t if and only if z>z. These thresholds satisfy z = z = z
when c ≤ 1/2 and z ≤ z<z when c>1/2.




, let ˆ θ = ˆ θ(α,β,z) be the unique solution to U(ˆ θ,−∞,α,β,z)=
0 (i.e., the static equilibrium threshold) and













The threshold ˜ z (α,β) is deﬁned by U(θ∞,−∞,α,β,˜ z (α,β) )=0a n di ss u c ht h a tˆ θ ≥ (≤)θ∞ if
a n do n l yi fz ≤ (≥)˜ z.T h et h r e s h o l dˆ z (α,β), on the other hand, is deﬁned so that ∂ˆ θ/∂α ≥ (≤)0
i fa n do n l yi fz ≥ (≤)ˆ z. To simplify notation, we henceforth suppress the dependence of ˆ θ on (β,z)
and of ˜ z and ˆ z on β.
First, consider c =1 /2, in which case ˆ z (α)=˜ z (α)=1 /2 for all α. When z<1/2, ˆ θ(α) >θ ∞
and ∂ˆ θ/∂α < 0 for all α ≥ α1 and therefore ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt >θ ∞ for all t. When instead z =1 /2,
ˆ θ(α)=θ∞ for any α ≥ α1, and therefore ˆ θ1 = ˆ θt = θ∞ for all t. Finally, when z>1/2, for any
α ≥ α1, ˆ θ(α) <θ ∞ and ∂ˆ θ/∂α > 0, and hence ˆ θ1 ≤ ˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t. The result thus holds with
z = z = z =1 /2.
Next, consider c<1/2,i nw h i c hc a s e˜ z (α) and ˆ z (α) are both decreasing in α, satisfy ˆ z (α) >
˜ z (α) >θ ∞ for all α, and converge to θ∞ as α →∞ .W h e nz ≤ θ∞, then clearly z<˜ z (α) < ˆ z (α)
for all α and therefore ˆ θ(α) is always higher than θ∞ and decreasing in α, which implies that
ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt >θ ∞ for all t. When z ∈ (θ∞, ˜ z (α1)), there are α00 >α 0 >α 1 such that ˜ z (α0)=ˆ z (α00)=z.
For α ∈ [α1,α 0), ˆ θ(α) is higher than θ∞ and decreases with α. As soon as α ∈ (α0,α 00), ˆ θ(α)
becomes lower than θ∞ and continues to decrease with α. Once α ≥ α00, ˆ θ(α) starts increasing with
23α, but never exceeds θ∞. Hence, ˆ θ1 >θ ∞ and ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt for all t. When z =˜ z (α1), ˆ θ1 = θ∞ ≥ ˆ θt for
all t. Finally, when z>˜ z (α1), ˆ θ(α) <θ ∞ for all α, and therefore ˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t. We conclude
that the result holds for c<1/2 with z = z = z =˜ z (α1).
Finally, consider c>1/2, in which case ˆ z (α) and ˜ z (α) are both increasing in α, satisfy
ˆ z (α) < ˜ z (α) <θ ∞, and converge to θ∞ as α →∞ .When z ≤ ˆ z (α1), then clearly z<ˆ z (α) < ˜ z (α)
for all α>α 1 and therefore ˆ θ(α) is always higher than θ∞ and decreasing in α, which implies
that ˆ θ1 ≥ ˆ θt >θ ∞ for all t. When z ∈ (ˆ z (α1), ˜ z (α1)), there is α0 >α 1 such ˆ z (α0)=z. For
α ∈ (α1,α 0), ˆ θ(α) is higher than θ∞ and increasing in α, whereas for α>α 0, ˆ θ(α) decreases
with α, converging to θ∞ from above. It follows that maxt≥1 ˆ θt ≥ ˆ θ1 >θ ∞. When z =˜ z (α1),
maxt≥1 ˆ θt ≥ ˆ θ1 = θ∞. When z ∈ (˜ z (α1),θ ∞), there are α00 >α 0 >α 1 such that ˜ z (α0)=ˆ z (α00)=z.
For α ∈ (α1,α 0), ˆ θ(α) is lower than θ∞ and increasing in α. For α ∈ (α0,α 00), ˆ θ(α) is higher than
θ∞ and increases with α. And for α>α 00, ˆ θ(α) decreases with α and asymptotes to θ∞ from above.
Hence, maxt≥1 ˆ θt >θ ∞ > ˆ θ1. Finally, when z ≥ θ∞, then clearly z>˜ z (α) > ˆ z (α) for all α and
therefore ˆ θ(α) is always lower than θ∞, increases with α, and asymptotes θ∞ from below. Hence,
ˆ θ1 ≤ ˆ θt <θ ∞ for all t. We conclude that the result holds for c>1/2 with z =ˆ z (α1), z =˜ z (α1),
and z = θ∞.




is continuous in ¯ xt for any ¯ xt ∈ R
t−1 × R,
and similarly V1 (¯ x1;δ) is continuous in ¯ x1 for any ¯ x1 ∈ R.15












for t ≥ 2. Note that, for all t, θt (¯ xt) is continuous in ¯ xt ∈ R and
takes values in [0,1]. Since the max operator is continuous, it follows that θt
¡
¯ xt¢
≡ maxτ≤t{θτ (¯ xτ)}
is also continuous in ¯ xt ∈ R
t and takes values in [0,1]. Furthermore, U (θ,−∞,α,β,z) is continuous




is continuous in R
t.
Consider next δ>0. To simplify notation, we henceforth suppress the dependence of pt,
vt and Vt on δ whenever there is no risk of confusion. For all t ≥ 1, the function pt (θ;¯ xt)=
15C o n t i n u i t yc a nb ee x t e n d e di nR
t
as follows. For any function f : A → R, where A ⊆ R
t
and t ≥ 1, we say that
f is continuous over A if and only if, for any x
t ∈ A and any ε>0, there exists η>0 such that, for any ˜ x
t ∈ A such
that for all τ ≤ t:( a )|˜ xτ − xτ| <ηif xτ ∈ R; (b) ˜ xτ < −1/η if xτ = −∞; (c) ˜ xτ > 1/η, if xτ =+ ∞, the following



































, and f (A) × g (B) ⊆ C ⊆ R
2

















































































− c is continuous in (x, ¯ xt−1, ¯ xt) ∈
R×R
t−1×R.16 It is then immediate that Vt
¡




¯ xt;¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
is also continuous in
(¯ xt−1, ¯ xt) ∈ R
t−1×R. Similarly, for t =1 ,v 1 (x;¯ x1) is continuous in (x, ¯ x1) ∈ R2 and therefore
V1 (¯ x1) is continuous in ¯ x1 ∈ R.
Proof of Proposition 3. (To simplify notation, we again suppress the dependence of pt,v t
and Vt on δ whenever this does not create confusion.)
Suﬃciency. Consider a sequence {¯ xt (δ)}
∞
t=1 that satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii) in the
proposition. The monotonicity of vt
¡
x;¯ xt¢
with respect to x (see proof of Lemma A2 above)







if and only if x ≤ (≥)¯ xt.
It follows that the strategies deﬁned by (i) − (iii) constitute a monotone equilibrium.
Necessity. Conversely, suppose that {at(·)}
∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium. Since in any such
equilibrium the measure of agents attacking in every period is decreasing in θ, the probability
of regime change is also decreasing in θ. Then, by standard representation theorems (Milgrom,
1981), the expected payoﬀ from attacking is decreasing in xt, implying that agents must follow
cut-oﬀ strategies. For {¯ xt}
∞




−∞ < ¯ xt < +∞, Vt
¡
¯ xt¢
≤ 0 if ¯ xt = −∞, and Vt
¡
¯ xt¢
≥ 0 if ¯ xt =+ ∞.
We next show that, in any equilibrium, ¯ xt < +∞ for all t ≥ 1 and ¯ x1 > −∞. Indeed, if
¯ xt =+ ∞, in which case pt (θ;+∞)=F
¡1
δ (1 − θ)
¢




























































can also be written as
R 1
0 Fp(y;x, ¯ x
t)dy, where Fp(y;x, ¯ x
t) is the (probability) measure of θ
for which p(θ;¯ xt) >y ,that is, Fp(y;x, ¯ x




−1 (y;¯ xt)|x;¯ x
t−1,δ
¢
if y ∈ [0,1), where
p
−1 (y;¯ xt) denotes the inverse of p(θ;¯ xt) with respect to θ. The continuities of p and Ψt then imply that Fp(y;x, ¯ x
t)
is continuous in (x, ¯ x
t) ∈ R × R
t−1
× R, for any y ∈ [0,1]. Since Fp(y;·) is also bounded from above by 1, from the
Dominated Convergence Theorem, it follows that
R 1
0 Fp(y;x, ¯ x












dθ. Furthermore, since the knowledge that the sta-




























δ (1 − θ0)
¢
− c. Since the latter is true for any
θ0 ∈ R, it is also true for θ0 → +∞, in which case F
¡1
δ (1 − θ0)
¢
→ 0. Together with the fact that vt is









and hence ¯ xt =+ ∞ can not be part of any equilibrium. A similar argument rules out ¯ x1 =+ ∞.
























− c. Since this
is true also for θ0 →− ∞ , and since v1 is bounded from above by 1 − c, we have that V1 (−∞)=
limx→−∞ v1 (x;−∞)=1− c>0, implying that ¯ x1 = −∞ can not be part of an equilibrium.
We conclude that (i) − (iii) necessarily hold in any monotone equilibrium.
Existence. For any δ>0, the monotonicity of v1 (x;¯ x1) in ¯ x1 along with its continuity in
x for any ¯ x1 and the fact that limx→−∞ v1 (x,−∞) > 0 > limx→+∞ v1 (x,+∞), implies that there
exist x0,x 00 ∈ R such that V1 (x0) ≥ v1 (x0,−∞) > 0 >v 1 (x00,+∞) ≥ V1 (x00). The continuity of
V1 (¯ x1) in ¯ x1 then ensures existence of a solution ¯ x1 (δ) ∈ (x0,x 00) to V1 (¯ x1;δ)=0 .
Next, consider t ≥ 2. For any given ¯ xt−1, a similar argument as above ensures the existence







< 0. Moreover, either there also exists
x0 ∈ R such that Vt
¡
¯ xt−1,x 0¢
≥ 0, or Vt
¡
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
< 0 for all ¯ xt ∈ R. In the former case, the
continuity of Vt
¡
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
in ¯ xt ensures the existence of ¯ xt ∈ (x0,x 00) such that Vt
¡
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
=0 .












< 0 for any x ∈ R and therefore








≤ 0. We conclude that there exists a
sequence {¯ xt (δ)}
∞
t=0 that satisﬁes conditions (ii) and (iii) in the proposition.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .We start by establishing pointwise convergence of Vt as δ → 0.F o r
any t ≥ 2 and any
¡
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
∈ R















− c = Ψt
¡












¯ xt−1, ¯ xt;0
¢
.

















18For δ>0, let Fp(y;¯ x
t,δ) be as in footnote 16. Similarly, for δ =0 ,F p(y;¯ x
t,0) = Ψt
¡
θt (¯ xt)|¯ xt;¯ x
t−1,0
¢
if y ∈ [0,1)
and Fp(y;¯ x





t,δ) → Fp(y;¯ x









t,0)dy, which gives the result.
26Similarly, for any ¯ x1 ∈ R, by (7),
lim
δ→0
V1 (¯ x1;δ)=Ψ1 (θ1 (¯ x1)|¯ x1) − c = U (θ1 (¯ x1);−∞,α 1,β,z) ≡ V1 (¯ x1;0).








for the unperturbed game (δ =0 )and reserve the use of Vt for the perturbed
games (δ>0).
Consider ﬁrst T =1and ﬁx an arbitrary ε>0. From the strict monotonicity of U1(¯ x1),19
U1 (x∗
1 − ε) > 0 >U 1 (x∗
1 + ε).
By the convergence of V1 to U1 as δ → 0, we can ﬁnd δ1(ε) > 0 such that, for any δ<δ 1 (ε),
V1 (x∗
1 − ε;δ) > 0 >V 1 (x∗
1 + ε;δ).
From the continuity of V1 (¯ x1;δ) in ¯ x1 for any δ>0, it follows that there exists a solution ¯ x1 (δ)
to V1 (x1;δ)=0such that x∗
1 − ε<¯ x1 (δ) <x ∗
1 + ε. Following the same steps as in the proof of
existence in Proposition 3, we can then construct an equilibrium {¯ xt (δ)}∞
t=1 for Γ(δ) such that
|¯ x1 (δ) − x∗
1| <ε .T h i sp r o v e st h er e s u l tf o rT =1 .
Consider next an arbitrary T ≥ 2, ﬁx ε>0, and suppose the result holds for T − 1.
Take ﬁrst any equilibrium of Γ(0) such that x∗
T > −∞. By the (local) strict monotonicity of UT
around x∗
T implied by the assumption that x∗



























. Without loss of generality, assume the ﬁrst






T−1 and the fact that the result holds for T −1, there exists some ε0
T ∈ (0,ε T) such that,
for any δ<δ(ε0
T,T− 1), there is a sequence ¯ xT−1(δ) satisfying the following three conditions:20
[C1] for all t ≤ T − 1, either ¯ xt (δ)=−∞ and Vt (¯ xτ (δ)) ≤ 0,o r¯ xt ∈ R and Vτ (¯ xτ (δ);δ)=0 ;
[C2] for all t ≤ T −1, |x∗
t − ¯ xt(δ)| <ε 0
T <εif x∗
t ∈ R, and ¯ xt (δ) < −1/ε0
T < −1/ε if x∗
t = −∞;





> 0 >U T
¡

















T−1 ×R,t h e r e
exists δT ∈ (0,δ(ε0
T,T− 1)) such that, for any δ<δ T, there is ¯ xT−1(δ) that satisﬁes [C1]-[C2] and
such that:




and the monotonicity of θ1 (¯ x1) in ¯ x1.
20Continuity of U implies existence of ε
0
T such that that [C3] holds for any ¯ x
T−1(δ) that satisﬁes [C2]; that the
result holds for T − 1 then ensures that, for any δ<δ(ε
0
T,T− 1), there exists ¯ x
T−1(δ) that satisﬁes both [C1] and
[C2].





> 0 >V T
¡








in xT, for the same ¯ xT−1(δ), there exists an ¯ xT(δ) ∈ R,
with |x∗
T − ¯ xT(δ)| <ε T <ε ,that solves VT
¡
¯ xT−1(δ), ¯ xT(δ);δ
¢
=0 .
Next, take any equilibrium of Γ(0) such that x∗





−c<0 for all xt < ˜ xt, where ˜ xt > −∞ solves θt (˜ xt)=θt−1
¡
x∗t−1¢
≡ maxτ≤t−1 θτ (x∗
τ). Pick some
x0




in xT−1 and the fact that the
result holds for T − 1, there exists some ε0 ∈ (0,ε) such that, for any δ<δ(ε0,T− 1)), there is a
sequence ¯ xT−1(δ) which satisﬁes conditions [C1]-[C2] above (replacing ε0
T with ε0) a n ds u c ht h a t :
[C4] UT
¡




By the pointwise convergence of VT to UT, there also exists a δT ∈ (0,δ(ε0,T− 1))) such that, for
any δ<δ T, there is ¯ xT−1 (δ) that satisﬁes [C1]-[C2] and such that:
[C40] VT
¡




If, for the same ¯ xT−1(δ), there exists an x00
T ∈ (−∞,x 0










in xT ∈ R,t h e r ei sa l s oa n¯ xT (δ) ∈ R, with x00
T < ¯ xT (δ) <
x0
T < −1/ε, such that VT
¡
¯ xT−1(δ), ¯ xT (δ);δ
¢




< 0 for all xT ∈
(−∞,x 0





Finally, recall that (6) admits at most two solutions in every t and therefore the set of xT∗ that
can be part of an equilibrium of Γ(0) is ﬁnite. Hence, there is δ (ε,T) ∈ (0,δ(ε,T − 1)) such that,
for any δ<δ (ε,T) and every equilibrium {x∗
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(0) for which x∗




for all t ≤ T, there exists ¯ xT (δ) such that, for all t ≤ T : if x∗






=0 ;and if x∗




≤ 0.U s i n g t h e s a m e
arguments as for the proof of existence in Proposition 3, ¯ xT (δ) is part of an equilibrium {¯ xt (δ)}∞
t=1
for Γ(δ), which completes the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Apart from a notational adjustment — namely the dependence of
U in period t on (βt,z t)and of (x∗
t,θ∗
t) on zt — the proof follows exactly the same steps as in the
model with only private information, and is thus omitted for brevity.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . Consider ﬁrst t =1 . For any (α1,β 1,z 1),U(θ∗,−∞,α 1,β 1,z 1) is
continuous in θ∗ ∈ [0,1] with U (0,−∞,·)=1 − c and U (1,−∞,·)=−c. Hence a solution
θ∗
1(z1) to U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β 1,z 1)=0always exists.22 Next, consider any t ≥ 2 and note that,
for any (θ∗




t−1,α t,β t,z t
¢
is strictly decreasing in zt and
U (θ∗,·,z t) → 1 − c>0 as zt →− ∞ , implying that necessarily maxθ∗∈[θ−1,1] U (θ∗,·,z t) > 0
for zt suﬃciently low. Furthermore, since U (θ∗,·,z t) is continuous in θ∗ ∈ [θ∗






→− c monotonically for any θ∗ ∈ [θ∗
t−1,1] as zt → +∞, from stan-
21This follows from the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 3.
22Note that the function θ
∗
1(·) is unique if and only if α1 ≥ β
2
1/2π. Hence for α1 <β
2
1/2π, the game trivially admits
multiple equilibria even if T =1 .





converges uniformly to −c
as zt → +∞, implying that maxθ∗∈[θ−1,1] U
¡
θ∗,θ∗
t−1,α t,β t,z t
¢
< 0 for zt suﬃciently high. The









t−1,α t,β t,z t
¢





, which also implies
that (9) admits a solution θ∗
t(zt) >θ ∗






is then an equilibrium: for t =1 ,θ ∗
1(z1) is any solution to U (θ∗
1,−∞,α 1,β 1,z 1)=0 ;for all
t ∈ {2,...,T},θ ∗




t−1(zt−1),α t,β t,z t
¢
=0 }. Note that, in this
equilibrium, at any t ≥ 2,θ ∗
t(zt) >θ ∗











all zt and all t is also an equilibrium, we conclude that the game admits multiple equilibria for any
{αt,β t}
T
t=1 and any T ≥ 2.
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